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INTRODUCTION
The United States finds itself in an era where the cost of state prisons' is
both extremely large and politically salient. State prisons held approximately 1.3
million people in 2012, almost twice as many people as county jails and more
than five times as many as federal prisons.2 The total cost of state corrections in
2010 was $48.5 billion. 3 In response, states nationwide are now experimenting
with ways to reduce their role in imprisonment. The United States Department
of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance launched the Justice Reinvestment Ini-
tiative to promote policies that reduce prison populations; the seventeen states
that have participated are expected to save up to $4.6 billion. 4 Perhaps the most
obvious example of a state prison depopulation policy is California's criminal
justice realignment: under a new law, California's state prisons now accept only
prisoners convicted of serious, violent, or sex offenses-other felons, even those
sentenced to multiple years, must serve their time in local jails. 5
1. Jail and prison are terms of art. Jail is county incarceration; prison is state incar-
ceration. Jail populations typically include inmates awaiting trial, inmates who
have not been charged and are awaiting arraignment before release, those who
cannot make bail, probation violators, and inmates serving shorter sentences.
Prisons-also called penitentiaries-take individuals sentenced to longer terms,
death row inmates, and parole violators. However, there is nothing ironclad about
which crimes or sentences must be served in either. In some states, prisoners can
serve multi-year jail terms; in some they can serve only a year or less. For instance,
Maryland makes the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, even though
misdemeanors can require longer sentences than some felony prison sentences.
Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early Amer-
ican Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461, 462, 490 (2009) ("In Maryland, the legisla-
ture can designate a crime as either a misdemeanor or a felony, irrespective of the
sentence imposed.").
2. Lauren E. Glaze & Erinn J. Herberman, Correctional Populations in the United
States, 2012, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 10 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf.
3. Tracey Kyckelhahn, State Corrections Expenditures, FY 1982-2oio, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scefy821o.pdf.
4. Nancy LaVigne et al., Justice Reinvestment Initiative State Assessment Report,
URBAN INST. & BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1, 3 (2014), http://www.urban.org/
uploadedpdf/412994-Justice-Reinvestment-Initiative-State-Assessment- Report
.pdf.
5. For an excellent overview of the changes in California, see Rebecca Sullivan Sil-
bert, Thinking Critically About Realignment in California, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL
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There is plenty of conversation about how to reduce state prison popula-
tions, but what almost no one talks about is this: there is no historical, logical,
or constitutional reason for state prisons to exist. Perhaps no one talks about
this because everyone assumes that state governments have always paid for
prisons, but, as this Article reveals, this conventional wisdom is wrong. States
neither built prisons nor paid for incarceration until the middle of the nine-
teenth century. State downsizing might, in fact, represent a return to our coun-
try's historical roots. It is time for us to stop treating state funding for prisons as
an inevitable and inherent part of the American criminal justice system, when it
is actually a relatively recent phenomenon based on a political economy that
has long since changed.
Given this history, one might ask why states decided to pay for prisons in
the first place. Why should states agree to subsidize the cost of prisons when lo-
cal officials-county prosecutors, locally elected judges, sheriffs, and police-
decide who goes there? Why should state governments subsidize prisons when
they don't pay for other criminal dispositions, such as jail, probation, or drug
treatment? Given that localities6 can and do make different decisions about the
sanctions accompanying violations of state law, why do states pay only for the
most expensive sanction (state incarceration) and not cheaper ones?
Frank Zimring and Gordon Hawkins raised this question in their 1991
book, The Scale of Imprisonment, referring to the state prison subsidy as the
"correctional free lunch. ' 7 They suggested that the correctional free lunch
might itself be responsible for over-incarceration, since prison is essentially free
WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY (2012), http://library.constantcontact.com/
downloadget/file/lO3416365531-32/Thinking+critically+about+realignment+in+
CA++2.29.pdf.
6. I tend to use the terms "localities" and "counties" interchangeably in this Article;
however, I note that two states are not divided into counties: Alaska and Louisi-
ana. Alaska is divided into boroughs; Louisiana is divided into parishes. These lo-
cal units are, however, similar to counties. See State & Country Quick Facts, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (last accessed Oct.
24, 2014). In unified corrections states, however, authority for all custodial prison-
ers-including, in some cases, probation, parole, and community corrections-is
combined into a single agency with a single budget. See, e.g., Barbara Krauth, A
Review of the Jail Function Within State Unified Corrections Systems, NAT'L INST. OF
CORR. (1997), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/ 014024.pdf. For an appraisal of uni-
fied corrections as an alternative means of addressing the correctional free lunch,
see W. David Ball, Defunding State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at Part II.B and C).
7- FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 140
(1991) ("It is likely that some tension is generated by the fact that the level of gov-
ernment that is responsible for paying the bills for the upkeep of prisons does not
make decisions about the numbers of persons sent to prison or the length of their
stay there. To judges and prosecutors imprisonment may seem to be available as a
free good or service or at least may be viewed as the subject of a major state gov-
ernment subsidy. This phenomenon.., we call the 'correctional free lunch ...').
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to local governments. But if prison subsidies might lead to overuse, why did
states ever agree to them? Zimring and Hawkins suggested that the answer lay in
the scale of imprisonment. By their account, the relatively stable size of the
prison population meant that costs were not readily apparent until the prison
population began to explode in the 197os.'
While scale is certainly a factor, this Article argues that the establishment of
the correctional free lunch is also the result of two other factors: the prison re-
form movement of the mid-nineteenth century and the economics of prison
labor. 9 Penal reformers in the 18oos promoted the establishment of state prisons
as a means of professionalizing and rationalizing correctional treatment. Re-
formers were not opposed to prison labor; indeed, they viewed labor as crucial
to rehabilitation. State governments were only too happy to take on prisoners,
since their labor generated revenue for the state. This is the missing piece of the
story: state governments wanted prisoners because their labor generated surplus
cash.'" The correctional free lunch started out as a catered lunch for the state.
Prisons only became an economic liability with the withering away of prison
labor.
Now that the original justifications for state control no longer apply-since
the belief in the professional and rehabilitative power of state prison is no long-
er dominant among reformers' and there are no economic benefits from con-
8. Id. at 141 ("One reason why the existing pattern of fiscal responsibility went unal-
tered and unchallenged was that until recently the states were not overwhelmed
with prisoners.").
9. For a comprehensive treatment of the role of prison labor in the creation of
American prisons, see REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT:
PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776-1941
(2008). McLennan's meticulous history explores the ways in which prison labor
was crucial to the establishment of prisons, prison discipline, and modern penol-
ogy, but it does not focus on the issue in this Article: the relationship between
state and local governments and the ways in which cost-passing and rent-seeking
behaviors might distort the usage of state prison as opposed to jail, probation, and
other criminal sanctions.
lO. Zimring and Hawkins discuss Rusche and Kirchheimer's theory about the rela-
tionship between free labor and the need to absorb it via prisons, see ZIMRING &
HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 6-1o, but this discussion centers on population, not
budgetary concerns. Hawkins gives the subject of prison labor a fuller treatment
in Prison Labor and Prison Industries, 5 CRIME & JUSTICE 85 (1983), where he argues
that prison labor should once again be deployed, id. at 86, but his economic anal-
ysis is again focused on how the economics of society affects prison policies-not
on the economics of prison policy itself-though he does mention the cost-
offsetting value of prison labor later in the Article, id. at 98, 115.
11. Beliefs changed in the 1970s, in what is now known as "the punitive turn." See,
e.g., THE NEW PUNITIVENESS: TRENDS, THEORIES, PERSPECTIVES (Pratt et al., eds.
2011); see also NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNITIVE STATE: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND
IMPRISONMENT ACROSS THE UNITED STATES (2006); Francis Cullen & Paul Gen-
dreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects, NAT'L
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trolling prison labor-are state prisons still a good idea? I argue that the answer
is no. State funding of prisons distorts local decision making; making prisons
free to local governments encourages their overuse. Because decisions about
criminal punishment are not aligned with budgetary responsibility for those de-
cisions, and because local agencies can externalize the costs of their policies to
the rest of the state-while being politically accountable only to local voters-
local policies will not be subjected to meaningful political or economic con-
straints.
This Article provides a historical and critical framework for evaluating the
provision of and responsibility for incarceration at the state and local levels. Ex-
amining the origins of the state prison system can help us reevaluate how it
should be structured today. That said, the emphasis here is on clearing the land,
not planting it. In other words, the goal of this Article is to decouple the con-
cept of incarceration from incarceration provided and paid for by state gov-
ernments, to understand that the system we have now is not the only one we
could have.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I focuses on the current political
economy of prison admissions and argues that the correctional free lunch has
contributed to the excessive use of state prisons. Part II looks at the establish-
ment of state prisons as an outgrowth of the prison reform movement, in which
prison reformers sought to build and regulate prisons as a means of promoting
rehabilitation. Part III looks at the history of prison labor and how prison labor
was an economic asset for the level of government that controlled it. Part IV
goes into more depth, focusing particularly on how local and state governments
actually battled for control over sentenced prisoners in order to control the
economic benefits they brought with them. Part V moves back more broadly to
explore the state's role in criminal justice, discussing where it might be essential,
where it might be optional, and where it might not be desirable at all.
I. LOCAL DECISIONS AND STATE PRISON POPULATIONS
State prison subsidies decouple the decision to send someone to prison
from the fiscal consequences of that decision. States have little control over
prison admissions yet bear all their costs. This Part explores how the correc-
tional free lunch contributes to the overuse of state prisons.
Decision-making authority in law enforcement and prosecution is over-
whelmingly local, but only some of the budgetary consequences of those deci-
sions are borne at the local level. With the end of prison labor, the costs of state
imprisonment are generally borne by state governments-and they are substan-
tial. As a result, not all costs are internalized to local decisionmakers. State pris-
on subsidies generate incentives for localities to make decisions that minimize
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV. (2000), http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal
_justice200/v0_3/03d.pdf.
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local costs and maximize those borne by the state, resulting in greater usage of
state prison facilities.
In the current system, counties'2 whose criminal justice policies result in
heavy usage of state prisons are subsidized; counties who use in-county disposi-
tions such as jail and probation are not. This puts a thumb on the scale in favor
of responding to crime with state imprisonment. The prison subsidy might be
justified if prison were demonstrably preferable to other options, such as proba-
tion or county jail, but there is no evidence that it is. Without that evidence, it
makes no sense to encourage the use of state prison and not other responses to
crime. The costs of all criminal justice interventions, prison or otherwise,
should be treated equally absent proof that one is superior to another.
A. Criminal Justice Is Local
Criminal law is written at the state level, but it is enforced, prosecuted, and
processed at the local level.'3 County and local officials, whether local law en-
forcement, probation officers, prosecutors, or even judges,' 4 have ample oppor-
tunity to influence crime and punishment outcomes through a variety of deci-
sions: whether to charge certain offenses as misdemeanors or felonies; whether
to suspend sentences or impose probation; whether to divert offenders into
drug or mental health treatment; what to charge and what to offer during plea
bargaining; and even whether to arrest, cite, or prosecute a given offense at all.'
12. For ease of expression, this paper uses the term "county" as a shorthand reference
to local administrative units that constitute the locus of decision-making on crim-
inal justice issues, including parishes, districts, and the like.
13. See, e.g., Mona Lynch, Mass Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale, lo
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 673, 682 (2011) ("[Clriminal justice policy is made and
put into action at the municipal, county, state, and national levels, and the thou-
sands of organizations that comprise this criminal justice network are, for the
most part, relatively autonomous both horizontally and vertically.").
14. The majority of states have some form of judicial election or retention process.
See Meryl J. Chertoff, Trends in Judicial Selection in the States, 42 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 47, 50 (2010) ("Currently, thirty-two states use contested elections (either
partisan or nonpartisan) to pick judges for at least some level of their courts, and
twenty-one states elect all judges. Twenty-five additional states utilize the so-
called 'merit selection' system, in which judges are initially selected by a state's
governor to serve a term in office, and then face the voters in an up-or-down un-
contested retention election.") (internal citations omitted).
15. Most countries (other than the United States) have mandatory prosecution. See,
e.g., Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for
Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1595-96 (2010) ("If the evidence supports
a criminal charge, the prosecutor in theory is obliged to file those charges and
does not ask if the prosecution is a wise use of limited resources or if it serves ap-
propriate social objectives. Those are questions for other government officials to
answer.").
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The state as a whole is, actually, not a whole-the system is made up of many
interlocking pieces, 6 with most of the criminal justice decision-making concen-
trated at the local level.17
Local control has, ironically, expanded alongside the expansion of state pe-
nal codes. William Stuntz has written the definitive treatment of why state penal
codes expand, arguing that expansive codes delegate authority to "prosecutors,
who are the criminal justice system's real lawmakers."'" Legislatures respond to
traumatic, well-publicized crimes with largely symbolic statutes-often target-
ing behavior that is already criminal-in order to send a signal that they under-
stand the scope of the tragedy.' 9 The end result is "criminal codes that cover
everything and decide nothing, that serve only to delegate power to district at-
torneys' offices and police departments. "20 These expansive codes mean that it
is possible to create multiple criminal charges out of a single event,2' giving local
prosecutors bargaining power in their plea negotiations. Because symbolic legis-
lation is cheap, and prosecutorial power is good for legislators, we cannot ex-
pect the legislature to curtail the expansion either of law enforcement's discre-
tion or the criminal code that enables it.22 This Article, then, takes as its starting
point Stuntz's analysis that state penal codes are unlikely to contract.
Because expansive state penal codes delegate power to local actors, state
prison overcrowding is driven by local decisionmakers. Mona Lynch has con-
cluded that "much of the criminal law and policy that resulted in mass incarcer-
ation is local at its core, emanating in large part from specific regions of the na-
tion and then diffusing from there." 3 She goes on to differentiate between "law
on the books" and law in action, noting that despite the existence of uniform
laws within a state, law in action results in "microlevel variation shaped by local
norms and culture related to how the business of criminal justice happens in
16. See generally W. David Ball, E Pluribus Unum: Data and Operations Integration in
the California Criminal Justice System, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 277 (2010). The Ar-
ticle also notes that the idea of purely "local" criminal justice is not without its
problems.
17. Moreover, the options available locally are themselves heterogeneous. A jail in one
county might differ from another in a different county in a multitude of ways,
such as approaches to discipline, the size and characteristics of the jail population,
the availability of rehabilitative services, or the availability of beds. Even rehabili-
tative programs differ from one another in their curricula, to whom they are
made available, how often they are made available, etc.
18. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, loo MICH. L. REV. 505,
506 (2001).
19. Id. at 531-32.
20. Id. at 509.
21. Id. at 519.
22. Id. at 510.
23. Lynch, supra note 13, at 674.
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any given place,"24 a phenomenon that she describes as "probably the least ex-
plored in the criminological literature in terms of its contributory role to mass
incarceration."25 In short, while expansive criminal statutes do not themselves
create crowded state prisons, expansive statutes enable the localized decisions
that result in overcrowding.26 State law is enforced in a non-uniform manner.
Absent mandatory arrest and prosecution, local officials have the power to de-
cide what kind of criminal justice resources to use. There is no statewide crimi-
nal justice policy, then, just a collection of different criminal justice policies, all
made with reference to-but different levels of enforcement of-state law.
B. Budgets Are Not Aligned with Responsibility
The cost of decisions made at the local level is not always borne at the local
level. The state typically pays for prisons and parole, while the county typically
pays for probation, jail, and diversion into drug treatment in lieu of criminal
penalties.2 7 Local policies that result in increased prison usage are thus subsi-
dized by the state, while policies that use local resources are not. The extent to
which this disjuncture actually affects decision-making at the margins-
whether, say, a judge opts for prison over jail solely on budgetary grounds-
remains unclear, and, for this analysis, is beside the point. This Article does not
analyze the problem along principal-agent lines, where individuals fail to take
social interests into account, but in terms of externalities, where the true costs
24. Id.
25. Id. at 680.
26. Id. at 676 ("Although sentencing statutes have been toughened at the state and
federal levels, thereby creating the capacity for mass incarceration, mass incarcera-
tion has not been realized without local-level criminal justice actors transforming
their daily practices to send more and more offenders away to state penal institu-
tions."). See also ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 141 ("While we speak of
state prison populations and state imprisonment policies, frequently the power to
choose between imprisonment and alternative sanctions and to fix terms of im-
prisonment is decentralized to the county level. Different areas in some states may
have sharply contrasting rates of use of state imprisonment facilities, so that state
aggregate rates of imprisonment may represent an amalgam of diverse imprison-
ment policies. Frequently what is called a state's imprisonment policy may include
elements beyond the short-term control of the executive and administrative pow-
ers of state government.").
27. States do, of course, vary widely in how their state and local governments are
funded, but this variation-and opacity-is actually part of the reason accounta-
bility gets lost. In other words, we do not have a generalizable model about state
and county functions and funding, making the analysis of a given state's prison
population dynamics much more complex and much less relatable to the local de-
cisions that underlie, in part, the reasons for changes in population.
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of a policy are not borne by the entity making them. If counties had to pay for
the true resource costs of policies that used prison, these policies would become
more expensive and scarcer. This is the power of accounting: evaluating the
costs of a policy depends on which budget one looks at. Policies that use local
resources, like probation, have to be accounted for and paid for locally. Their
budgetary impacts are clear to the actors using them. Policies that use prison
need not be accounted for, so they cost local governments nothing. This distorts
local choices by making some policies appear cheaper and more readily availa-
ble than others, but they are cheaper and more readily available only in a local
and fiscal sense, rather than in a societal and absolute sense. 9
Decisions that promote the use of "off the books" resources need not be
made consciously. Suppose, for example, that a city decides to use broken win-
dows policing, where police aggressively pursue any infraction, no matter how
minor.3° Broken windows policies necessarily increase the usage of other crimi-
nal justice resources.3' Jails become more crowded as arrestees are processed.
The caseloads of public defenders and district attorneys increase. More court
time is used. It is likely that at least some of those arrested under broken win-
dows will be found to have violated parole terms or to be guilty of prison-
eligible statutes affecting felons (e.g., being an ex-felon in possession of a fire-
arm). The true cost of broken windows policing is at least partly subsidized by
other agencies and the state without their input or control.32 This means that, in
28. William J. Stuntz, however, expressly makes a principal-agent argument in Une-
qual Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969,1974 (2008).
29. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 211. "The rational operation of the system..
.depends on the agency that is to incur the cost of imprisonment also having the
power to determine the extent of imprisonment. Violation of this assumption can
result in patterns of imprisonment that are anything but cost-effective across all
levels of government. Yet the current distribution of prosecutorial, sentencing,
and correctional authority in all states violates that assumption to an exorbitant
degree." Id. Because localities do not pay for prisons, the marginal cost of prison
is zero. Id. This means that if there is any benefit (marginal benefit greater than
zero), officials are likely to imprison, even when total systemic costs are greater
than the marginal benefits. Id. at 212.
30. For an examination of the cost of arrest in a zero tolerance policing context, see
Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 280-90 (2009).
31. This is why I propose that, in a stateless system, all local criminal justice agencies,
including police, should be unified at the local level. See Ball, supra note 6.
32. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 140 ("One reason for the passive, almost fa-
talist, attitude of correctional administrators to forecasting correctional popula-
tions.., is the passive role played by correctional administration, and the level of
government that sustains it, in regard to the determination of prison and jail pop-
ulations. From the standpoint of prison administration the problems are a mix-
ture of separation of powers and federalism. Even if jail policy is determined by
units of local government, it is not the people who run the jails who fill the jails
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considering whether to pursue a broken windows policy, municipal police need
only consider whether they can pay for their increased staff time.33 They need
not think about whether they can afford the downstream costs of their policy-
more court time, staff time from other agencies, and carceral resources-
because those costs are not in their budget.3 4
When Zimring and Hawkins discussed the correctional free lunch, they
looked for some evidence that it had distorted usage of criminal justice re-
sources. From 1970 to 1987, they observed that (county-funded) jail populations
increased 83% while (state-funded) prison populations increased 192%,35 sug-
gesting that, in a general sense, the "cheaper" form of incarceration was used
more heavily. In some areas, however, the correctional free lunch might even
turn into a profit opportunity, as overcrowded state prisons pay local facilities
to house state prisoners.36 Half of Louisiana's state inmates, for example, are
housed in local (parish) jails; the sheriffs receive a per diem to hold state pris-
oners. 7 Federal prisoners can also generate revenue,"8 and as far back as the late
but rather the police and the judiciary. State prison populations are determined
by state legislatures, state and local judges, and local prosecutors. Only rarely are
those who administer prisons given any substantial authority to set the terms of
imprisonment served by those in their custody.").
33. For an example of how this might distort a district attorney's perspective, see Ste-
ven Mayer, Kern DA Measures Success by the Number Sent to Prison, PRISON
REFORM MOVEMENT (Oct. 11, 2008, 1:30 PM), http://prisonreformmovement
.wordpress.com/2oo/ilo/in/kern-da-measures-success-by-the-number-sent-to
-prison ("'We tend to measure our performance by the per capita prison com-
mitment rate,' [Kern County District Attorney Ed] Jagels said. 'We've always been
at the top until the last three years."').
34. These downstream costs are somewhat related, however. Some state tax revenue
from the municipality will undoubtedly pay for some of the costs, but the link is
so attenuated that it will fail to send transparent signals-or the attendant politi-
cal accountability-to the populace about local decisions.
35. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 213. Zimring and Hawkins do not claim that
all demand for prison beds is economically based or that demand is essentially
limitless. Some demand depends on individual views of actors in the system as
well as the human costs of imprisonment. Id. at 214-15.
36. A cautionary note: state budgets are sui generis. There are no clear rules about
how states fund localities in general, how they raise taxes, which programs are
administered by the state or subsidized by it, and the like. But as long as there is
some disjuncture between decision-making authority and budgetary responsibil-
ity, there will be distortions.
37. Campbell Robertson, Sheriff Wants a Big Jail in New Orleans, but City Balks, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/o2/16/us/6orleans.html.
38. Ken McLaughlin, Santa Clara County's Lucrative Jail Business Takes a Hit, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 5, 2009), http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking
-news/ci_13929429 ("'To be quite honest I'd prefer not to have federal and state
prisoners and inmates from other counties,' [Edward Flores, chief of the Santa
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nineteenth century, before the creation of the first federal prisons, federal pris-
oners were a significant source of revenue to states that housed them. 9
C. Localities Disagree on Criminal Justice Policies
Across states, but particularly in populous states, localities tend to use crim-
inal justice resources at varying rates. These differences are not dictated by
crime rates or by statute; rather, they reflect local policy preferences and norms.
Police officers are not required to arrest those who violate the law; prosecutors
are not obliged to prosecute those who are arrested. Even if someone is arrested
or prosecuted, there are a myriad of choices about what offense to charge, what
sentence to recommend, and the like. These local policy choices have aggregat-
ed themselves into statewide problems, but the complexity of the system serves
to insulate decision makers from accountability and obscure their contributions
to state prison population increases. 40
Localities use state prison at different rates, but these differences are not the
result of underlying differences in the reported violent crime rate. In a prior
work, I examined ten years of California data from 2000 to 2009 and concluded
that, while there was great variation in California counties' usage of prison, this
variation was not due to differences in underlying violent crime rates: reported
violent crime rates explained only three percent of the variance in new felon
admissions.4 1 Moreover, the group of California counties with the highest rates
of prison usage had below-average reported violent crime rates, and individual
counties with similar violent crime rates had radically different rates of prison
usage. 42 Although California may be atypical, these data at least prove that a
crime-prison linkage is not necessary, 43 and it suggests that there is a large
Clara County Department of Corrections] said. But he and other county officials
emphasize that the revenue-generating inmates-who in March accounted for
nearly io percent of the jail population-have become an economic necessity in a
world of tight county budgets.").
39. BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A STUDY IN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY
PRIOR TO 1915, at 154 (paperback ed., Patterson Smith 1972) (1936).
40. See generally Lynch, supra note 13.
41. W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (On the State's Dime): How Violent Crime Does
Not Drive California Counties' Incarceration Rates-And Why It Should, 28 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 987, 1022 (2012).
42. Id. at 1023. For example, from 2000 to 20o9, Fresno County and San Francisco
County had similar population sizes. Even though San Francisco suffered from
greater levels of violent crime, Fresno sent 21/2 to 7 times as many people to prison
each year, and had between 2 and 3 times the number of people in prison. Other
pairs of counties demonstrate similar disjunctures. Id. at 995 n.27.
43. This empirical analysis does not address a second objection-that crime might, in
fact, be the result of policies, not simply an exogenous phenomenon. For addi-
tional explanations of the relationship between policies and prison growth, see,
for example, John F. Pfaff, The Macro and Micro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA.
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amount of prison usage that can be explained by county choices. In other
words, after controlling for violent crime, counties choose prison. They do not
have prison thrust upon them. The question is why the state subsidizes this
choice.
Additional studies also underscore the extent of local policy differences
within states. A study of the Illinois death penalty found that "the counties with
the most murders are not the counties most likely to declare a case capital.""4 In
California, three counties accounted for 83% of death sentences in 2009 .4 1 Na-
tionwide, "1% of counties account[] for roughly 44% of all death sentences." 46
Counties in California have shown differences in the rates at which they file ju-
venile cases directly in adult courts47 and in the way in which they charge and
file offenses eligible to be sentenced under the "three strikes" law,4s The point of
these examples is to illustrate what to most readers will seem axiomatic. In all
ST. U. L. REV. 1239, 1254 (2012) (concluding that "[p]rison growth has been driven
by admissions, and at least since the early 199os admissions have been driven by
prosecutorial filing decisions").
44. Leigh B. Bienen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the Aftermath of the Ryan Com-
mutations: Reforms, Economic Realities, and a New Saliency for Issues of Cost, loo J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1301, 1331 (2010).
45. Natasha Minsker et al., Death in Decline 'o9, ACLU OF N. CAL. at i (2010),
https://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal-justice/death-penalty/death in decline_o
9.pdf; see also Romy Ganschow, Death by Geography: A County by County Analysis
of the Road to Execution in California, ACLU OF N. CAL., https://www.aclunc
.org/docs/criminal-justice/death-penalty/death-by-geography/death-bygeograp
hy.pdf (last accessed Oct. 24, 2014).
46. Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 227, 233 (2012).
47. Selena Teji & Mike Males, An Analysis of Direct Adult Criminal Court Filing 2oo3-
2009: What Has Been the Effect of Proposition of 21?, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, 21 (2011), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/What has been
the effect of Prop_21.pdf (noting disparities in direct-filing). The study con-
cludes that "prosecutor predilection towards direct-filing is not founded upon
any demonstrable effect of reducing juvenile crime rates." Id. at 5. Instead, the au-
thors suggest, the issue is affected by who pays for incarceration: the costs of in-
carcerating youth convicted in adult courts are borne by the state. "The data anal-
ysis suggests that direct adult criminal court filing is being disproportionately
used by prosecutors from state-dependent, high direct filing counties. These
youth, if convicted and sentenced to confinement, are housed in state youth cor-
rectional facilities. If a youth is confined at DJF [Division of Juvenile Facilities] as
a result of an adult court commitment, the county is not charged by DJF through
its sliding scale system." Id. at 8.
48. See Elsa Y. Chen, In the Furtherance of Justice, Injustice, or Both? A Multilevel Anal-
ysis of Courtroom Context and the Implementation of Three Strikes, JUSTICE Q. 1, 20
(2012) (finding, inter alia, that "[plolitical conservatism appears to influence the
extent to which the law is implemented").
33 :75 2014
WHY STATE PRISONS?
states-but particularly in heavily populated, heterogeneous states-there are
parts of the state that tend to favor more rehabilitation and parts that are more
punitive. Only the choices favoring prison, however, are subsidized by the en-
tire state.
Democratic checks provide no solution to the heterogeneity problem, given
that elections of law enforcement (including district attorneys) are overwhelm-
ingly local. Residents of one county have no say in selecting officials from an-
other county, even though non-residents must pick up the check for any poli-
cies that result in state imprisonment. State residents can vote only for their lo-
local DA,49 their local sheriff, and their local judges. They can serve only on
their own county's juries. They vote only for their own mayors and city coun-
cilmembers who, in turn, hire local law enforcement and corrections officials."
Local officials might, in fact, be keenly attuned to local needs, and, more im-
portantly, they are more accountable to their local constituents than, say, the
state secretary of corrections is. But a resident of one county who disagrees-
and does not wish to pay for-the policies of another county has no ability to
change those policies without moving to the offending county, registering to
vote, and voting against the current crop of policymakers during the next elec-
tion. Without political accountability to the state as a whole, and without full
budgetary accountability to the local population, local policymakers are free to
deviate from statewide norms: they can please their constituents without re-
quiring them to bear the full cost of their policy choices and without fear of bal-
lot-box reprisals from those outside the county.
D. There Is No Right Answer
Subsidizing county prison use would pose no problem if there were a con-
sensus that prison is a better way of responding to crime than alternatives such
as drug treatment, day reporting, and probation. After all, states commonly in-
centivize localities to pursue better policies through subsidies. There is no evi-
dence, however, that prisons are demonstrably superior to the alternatives, and
until we can agree-or prove-that prison is superior, states should not make it
cheaper than the alternatives.
The argument against state prison subsidies, then, does not depend on
proving that prisons are an inefficient use of resources-even though there is
substantial evidence to support that claim.5' Instead, it turns on the more mod-
49. Note that DAs are not elected in all states. Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey
have state appointments of local DAs. Carol J. DeFrances, Prosecutors in State
Courts, 2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 2 (2002), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/pscoi.pdf.
50. Of course, they vote for the representatives who write the statutes, but the statutes
themselves grant so much discretion that how they are written is less important
than how they are enforced.
51. One study's authors, upon reviewing "the best available evidence," were "per-
suaded that prisons do not reduce recidivism more than noncustodial sanctions."
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est argument that unless we can make the case that prisons are better than all the
other options, we shouldn't subsidize them and nothing else.
People can and do disagree about the most effective means of promoting
public safety. If society does not agree on which policies are best, variation
might be a virtue. Localities can experiment and find out what works. A high-
prison-use county52 might be right about incarceration working. If so, it should
reap the benefits. If a low-prison-use county is right about probation, it should
reap the benefits. But neither county should have to bear the costs of the other's
mistakes, nor should there be a thumb on the scale in favor of one or the other.
The policies should have to prove their worth, not have their worth assumed by
the state. As long as there is substantial decision-making authority vested at the
county and local level-and there is53 -costs and benefits should be aligned
with that authority. Otherwise, bad policies, whatever they end up being, can be
overfunded and good policies underfunded.
Moving beyond the cost-benefit framework, one must also consider the
normative elements of society's response to crime. Even if we agreed on which
interventions reduce crime and by how much, we might still disagree about
whether, normatively, expenditures on those interventions would be worth it.14
If punishment is partly an expression of values, such expression makes a strong-
Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Johnson, & Daniel S. Nagin, Prisons Do Not Reduce
Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science, 91 PRIS. J. 4 8S, 5oS (2011). The prob-
lem with current studies is that most estimates of incapacitation "rig the data in
favor of finding such an [incapacitation] effect. This is because they compare how
many crimes are prevented if offenders are locked up as compared with doing
nothing to them. Of course, this comparison makes no sense because the alterna-
tive to imprisonment would be some noncustodial penalty." Id. at 51S (internal ci-
tations omitted). Indeed, prison has variable effects, "leading some categories of
offenders to recidivate less often," but, for others, "the overall impact of impris-
onment might not simply be null but be iatrogenic; that is, prisons might have a
criminogenic effect on those who experience it." Id. The authors conclude that
"[t]he era of mass imprisonment has taken over corrections even though nobody
has had a firm idea of whether placing offenders behind bars makes them more or less
likely to recidivate." Id. at 59S.
52. Usage is, of course, relative, and saying that a county uses a "high" rate of prison
necessarily involves judgments about what a "normal" usage of prison is. I have
dealt with this issue in a prior article, where I defined "high use" counties as those
in the top quartile of state new-felon-admissions-to-violent-crime ratios more
than seven often years. Ball, supra note 41, at 1014.
53. Indeed, as Stuart Scheingold argues, "[s] tandards of uniformity and formal equal-
ity... have a hollow ring to them" since they "have never really been widely hon-
ored." STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER 211 (2010).
54. See W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 395
(2011).
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er, not weaker, case for localism and local payment.55 Paying to vindicate one's
own values demonstrates how sincerely those values are held. Forcing other
people to put their money where my mouth is weakens the expressive value of
my sentiments.
II. THE ORIGIN OF STATE PRISONS
The preceding Part has shown that imprisonment need not be subsidized
by state governments-and, indeed, that the practice might result in less effi-
cient and less desirable outcomes. In the absence of statewide consensus on
criminal justice policies, states should, at the very least, stop treating prison dif-
ferently. This means either that states should stop paying for localities' prison
usage or that they should also subsidize everything else. Without proof that in-
carceration in state prison is the best policy, states should not encourage that
policy via the prison subsidy.
If state subsidies are such a bad idea, however, why are they the norm?
There are two historical reasons, neither of which presently obtains. This Part
explains why states established and regulated prisons in the first place.
State prisons are a relatively recent phenomenon. Given the current size
and scale of state prisons in the United States, it seems strange to consider that,
at the time of the country's founding, prison was not the default punishment
and that incarceration (when it was imposed) was administered locally. As late
as 1775, Pennsylvania saw "little or no imprisonment as a normal punishment
for crimes." 6 Instead,
Felonies were almost exclusively punished by death and the lesser of-
fenses by fines or brutal forms of corporal punishment, such as whip-
ping, branding, mutilating and exposure in the stocks and pillory.
There was no unified state prison system. The local county and munic-
ipal jails were the typical penal institutions of the period. In them there
was no classification or separation of convicts on any basis.57
Pennsylvania was not alone in this regard. In the country as a whole there were
many punishments for crimes, but "[w]hat was not on the list was imprison-
ment. The local jails held men (and it was almost always men) ... awaiting trial
or convicted but not yet punished, or men who were in debt without having
satisfied their obligations." 8
55. See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-13 (2012)
(discussing how early criminal justice practices in the United States were local in
nature).
56. HARRY ELMER BARNES, THE EVOLUTION OF PENOLOGY IN PENNSYLVANIA: A STUDY
IN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY 72 (Patterson Smith 1968) (1927).
57. Id. at 73.
58. David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 101
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman, eds., 1998). Punishment was also local-and
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After the American Revolution, Quakers in Pennsylvania were influential in
moving the state from corporal (and capital) punishment towards imprison-
ment; it is against this backdrop that the Walnut Street Jail, the most influential
house of incarceration in the late eighteenth century, was established in Phila-
delphia.59 This jail has been described as a "semi-state prison"6": though it was
used to house state prisoners alongside local jail populations,6 1 it was not part of
a broader state system.
The country's move away from corporal and capital punishment toward
imprisonment was seen as an international exemplar. In the 1830s, the French
government sent Gustave de Beaumont and Alexis de Toqueville to study the
penitentiary system. This tour resulted in de Toqueville's monumental work
Democracy in America, but that book was merely a personal project. At the time,
the real draw to the government of France was not our democracy, but our pe-
nal institutions." Indeed, the French authors wrote that "it is a matter of pride
to every American, that the new penitentiary system has been first established
and practiced in this country."6 3
In 1867, de Beaumont and de Toqueville's evaluation of the U.S. penal sys-
tem was supplanted by a work that gives us our best understanding of the state
of American incarceration before the establishment of the state prison system.
Report on the Prisons and Reformatories of the United States and Canada, by
prison reformers E.C. Wines and Theodore W. Dwight, has been described as
"the most thorough account of the nation's prisons in the post-Civil War era."
64
not carceral-in England. In the Anglo-Saxon era predating the Norman con-
quest, the most common punishments for crimes were mutilation, death, exile,
and financial compensation; only witchcraft and theft were punished by impris-
onment. Edward M. Peters, Prison Before the Prison: The Ancient and Medieval
Worlds, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN
WESTERN SOCIETY 31 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman, eds., 1998). In the eight-
eenth century, England punished most offenders with "whipping, the pillory, and
the gallows" and "only a small minority were actually imprisoned as punishment,
usually for such minor offenses as vagrancy." Randall McGowen, The Well-
Ordered Prison, England 178o-1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE
PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 72 (Norval Morris & David J.
Rothman, eds., 1998).
59. GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN
THE UNITED STATES, AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE I (Francis Lieber trans., 1833).
6o. BARNES, supra note 56, at 3.
61. LeRoy B. DePuy, The Walnut Street Prison: Pennsylvania's First Penitentiary, 18 PA.
HIST. 130,136 (1951).
62. Rothman, supra note 58, at 1OO.
63. Francis Lieber, Introduction to DE BEAUMONT & DE TOQUEVILLE, supra note 59, at
viii.
64. Rothman, supra note 58, at 111.
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Their report involved a comprehensive survey of carceral officials6" followed by
in-person visits to jails and penitentiaries around the country.
Wines and Dwight were key architects of state governmental control over
prisons, arguing that "[t]he reform which would crown, and give efficiency to,
all the others is a central authority of some kind, having the general oversight
and control of the entire prison system of the state."66 As they noted, however,
no state in their survey had such an authority.6 7 State prisons were run as local
fiefs, by politically appointed wardens pursuing independent policies, 68 with a
high degree of turnover.69 No states other than New York and Massachusetts
succeeded in even examining all the prisons of their states, but even where there
were inspections, prison boards were "little more than advisory" with "no pow-
er of enforcement. In effect, the administration of the prisons was left to indi-
vidual superintendents. '" 7 California provides the most absurd example of just
how gossamer-thin "state" systems could be: at statehood in 1850, the state pris-
on was established by legislative fiat, with an act that announced that all six
county jails in the state were henceforth "declared to be a State prison until such
time as the State should build one."71
Wines and Dwight saw two advantages to state centralization that went be-
yond coordination of the placement and treatment of prisoners. First, they saw
local jails as disgusting, deplorable institutions that were "but public schools,
maintained at the expense of the community, for the encouragement of vice,
65. E.C. WINES & THEODORE W. DWIGHT, REPORT ON THE PRISONS AND
REFORMATORIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, MADE TO THE LEGISLATURE
OF NEW YORK, JANUARY, 1867, at 19-36 (1867) (listing the 430 questions in interrog-
atories to prison officials about prison control, central authority, staff, their quali-
fications, discipline, religion, education, hygiene, prison labor, sentence lengths,
race, and costs, among many other subjects). Jail officials were sent a mere 102
questions. Id. at 36-39.
66. Id. at 335.
67. Id. at 77.
68. MCKELVEY, supra note 39, at 44-45.
69. WINES & DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 77.
70. Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform, United States 1865-1965, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 58, at 153. Not until 19ol did New York com-
bine oversight of prisons and prison industries "into one commission with full
authority to appoint and remove officers of state institutions, to order transfers or
new construction in both state and local institutions, and to manage industries."
MCKELVEY, supra note 39, at 127.
71. BONNIE L. PETRY & MICHAEL BURGESS, SAN QUENTIN: THE EVOLUTION OF A STATE
PRISON 8 (2005). It is important to remember, however, that state governments
themselves were growing in power and sophistication, and one might argue that
construction of imposing, fortress-like prisons was an expression of that power.
Sing Sing prison in New York, for example, has been called the American Bastille.
REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, supra note 9, at i.
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and for providing an unbroken succession of thieves, burglars, and profli-
gates."72 Jails had no programming: there was no education, no work, and no
religion.73 Many of those confined in vermin-infested cells were later deter-
mined to be innocent. 74 Wines and Dwight were not alone in this estimation. In
general, the prison reform movement pushed for state supervision and control
"chiefly because of the irresponsibility of the counties."75
Second, these reformers believed that state carceral institutions were the
best hope for reforming prisoners and that prisons needed time for reformation
to be effective. Medical metaphors (e.g., "curing" one of criminal tendencies)
were widely used to support the imposition of indeterminate sentences-that is,
sentences that terminated in a discretionary release into parole. Zebulon
Brockway, a famous warden at Elmira State Reformatory in New York, noted
that it would be foolish to tell a doctor that a patient had to stay in the hospital
for a certain number of days and then force the patient to be released whether
or not she had gotten well. 76 The same was true for prisoners. 77 Brockway
wanted the option to keep prisoners in state facilities because he believed he
could use this time to rehabilitate them. 78 These longer sentences were not
meant for punishment, but for rehabilitation. 79 This view informed the modern
understanding of the relationship between felonies and prisons. The first Model
Penal Code defined felonies in terms of treatment: because local jails lacked the
ability to reform prisoners, and because at least a year was needed for effective
treatment, serious offenses needed long sentences in professionally-
administered state prisons.' °
72. WINES & DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 67. They described their visit to the jail in Jef-
ferson City, Missouri, for example, "with mingled feelings of horror and disgust."
Id. at 319. Even the jails in their home state of New York were "in a deplorable
condition; utterly unworthy of our civilization, and of the renown and fame we
have acquired among our sister states and the nations of the world." Id. at 321.
73. Id. at 317.
74. Id. at 317-18.
75. MCKELVEY, supra note 39, at 21o.
76. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 33 (2002).
77. James J. Beha II, Redemption to Reform: The Intellectual Origins of the Prison Re-
form Movement, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 773, 796 (20o8).
78. ROTHMAN, supra note 76, at 33-35.
79. WINES & DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 65-66.
8o. See, e.g., Tress, supra note 1, at 484 ("Because jails lacked the reformative pro-
grams of the state prisons, the revisors [sic] stipulated that no imprisonment in a
county jail would exceed one year. This made a sentence of more than one year
and a sentence of incarceration in the penitentiary equivalent-an automatic sen-
tence. Eventually, some jurisdictions used the 'more than one year' length of sen-
tence instead of the place of incarceration to define felony, and this became the
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To implement a reformatory, medicalized system, prisoners needed to be
classified. Indeed, this was one of the problems with local jails: the commingling
of the young and old, sentenced and not sentenced, men and women."' But clas-
sification, Wines and Dwight argued, required state governments to be at the
helm. Under the late i86os system of "separate local jurisdictions," classification
was "impossible": it could "neither be established nor worked otherwise than by
combined action and a general administration."'S2
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that there is nothing inherent about the
word "felony" that requires a felon to serve time in a state institution. At least as
late as 1823, more than a generation after the ratification of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, one treatise author wrote that it was "impossible to know precisely in what
sense we are to understand this word [felonyl ."83 Felony is now, generally, taken
to mean crimes punished by sentences of more than one year, with time served
in state prison, but this doctrine developed haphazardly and is as much a result
of New York's definition in 1829 in its revised penal code-and its leadership in
penology-as anything else.8 4 The notion of felony and misdemeanor classifica-
tion itself, then, comes from the nineteenth-century reform movement. We be-
gan to think of sending felons to prison only after we had prisons to send them
to. The contemporary idea that there is a necessary connection between felonies
and state imprisonment is a result of the formation of state prisons, not a cause
of their formation.
III. STATE PRISONS AS PROFIT CENTERS
Part II illustrated why reformers wanted state prisons; this Part explains
why states were willing to take on the responsibility for prisoners. Up until the
twentieth century, prisoners were profitable, not costly. As far back as the reign
of the English King Henry 11 (1133-1189), the rights to operate jails were sold to
individuals who profited by the difference between the cost of running the pris-
on and the per-prisoner allocation given the operator.8" Jails charged fees to
prisoners: iron fees, for example, were those a prisoner paid to avoid being in
shackles during his or her time in jail. 6 Jailers were expected to earn their in-
definition used in the Model Penal Code."); see also id. at 487 (citing MODEL
PENAL CODE 23 (Council Draft No. 1, 1953)) (claiming that a year was needed "to
apply any substantial program of treatment").
81. WINES & DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 316 (internal citations omitted).
82. Id. at 116.
83. Tress, supra note 1, at 465.
84. See id.
85. Peters, supra note 58, at 31.
86. Id. at 32. The fee-paying in criminal justice extended well beyond imprisonment:
crime victims were also expected to bear all the costs of prosecution. George Fish-
er, The Birth of the Prison Retold, 104YALE L.J. 1235, 1248 (1995).
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come from these fees, a practice that continued into the eighteenth century in
England.s"
The window for the establishment of state prisons, during which the goals
of reformers overlapped with the economic benefits of prison labor, was brief:
the Wines and Dwight study was published in 1867, but within thirty years,
prison labor had begun its decline. 8 By that point, the idea that states could and
should have a statewide system of punishment had already taken hold. State
prisons came of age during a time when they were economically viable, but even
when prisons no longer paid, state governments maintained responsibility for
them. The problem with this arrangement would remain hidden until the scale
of imprisonment exploded in the 197os.
Prison labor attracted two different constituencies: those interested in the
rehabilitative power of work, and those interested in the economic benefits.
Prison reformers Wines and Dwight, for example, pointed out that prison labor
was both fiscally prudent and penologically sound, noting that
The element of hard labor in the sentence is the dictate at once of jus-
tice and policy: of justice, because it is right that criminals, who have
put the state to more or less expense, should do something towards de-
fraying the public cost of their crimes; of policy, because work is an es-
sential condition of the prisoner's reformation; and reformation, so far
as this class of persons is concerned, is the great interest of the state.s
De Beaumont and de Toqueville, writing some forty years earlier, agreed, 9°
though they noted that, while European prisoners kept the value of the goods
they made, in the United States "the criminal owe[d] all his labour to society, in
87. McGowen, supra note 58, at 74 ("Prisons were largely self-financing operations,
and the jailer was supposed to derive his income from the fees owed by prisoners
for various legal services. In addition, the jailers enjoyed the profits from whatever
commercial opportunities they could organize. They might collect fees from visi-
tors, charge for bedding, or benefit from the sale of beer in the prison. In the larg-
er prisons the office was so lucrative that it was widely sought after."). The English
prison reformer John Howard was particularly outraged when he found an ac-
quitted man behind bars because he could not pay jailers' fees, leading him to
write The State of Prisons in England and Wales in 1777, a book that has been cred-
ited with "making the prison the center of focus, shifting all other forms of pun-
ishment to the margins" and sparking the passage of the Penitentiary Act of 1779.
Id. at 79.
88. MCLENNAN, supra note 9, at 185.
89. WINES & DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 248.
90. DE BEAUMONT & DE TOQUEVILLE, supra note 59, at 22 ("Far from being an aggrava-
tion of the punishment, it is a real benefit to the prisoner. But even if the criminal
did not find in it a relief from his sufferings, it nevertheless would be necessary to
force him to it. It is idleness which has led him to crime; with employment he will
learn how to live honestly. Labour of the criminals is necessary still under another
point of view: their detention, expensive for society if they remain idle, becomes
less burthensome [sic] if they labour.").
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order to indemnify it for the expenses of his detention."9 ' The moral compo-
nent of not draining the public fisc even extended to parents of juvenile delin-
quents: Wines and Dwight argued that parents of delinquents should pay for
the cost of their children's incarceration or be put to hard labor themselves. 92
Prison labor reformed prisoners and also "brought the state a financial return
on its prison investment."93
Prison labor was employed in a variety of ways. 94 Convicts could work di-
rectly for the state, or the state could buy goods made by convict labor, a prac-
tice that continues to this day.95 Many states used prison labor to build the pris-
ons themselves, saving on the costs of construction, as California did with San
Quentin State Prison 96 and New York did with Sing Sing.97 Another system was
on-site contracting, where a contractor would come into a prison and oversee
the convicts' work.9' Contracting was the most common form of prison labor in
Wines and Dwight's survey.99
Convicts could also be leased directly to private companies-an early form
of privatization-whereby the state was paid either (a) a lump sum for all its
prisoners or (b) a daily rate per prisoner used. The company who leased the
prisoners was responsible for their care and feeding, such as it was. In Georgia,
for example, lessees had to keep prisoners, pay to transport them, and fulfill all
duties under the law concerning their management and care.' °0 Southern states
91. Id. at 36-37. Even earlier, one commentator in Pennsylvania rejected the idea that
taxes should pay for prisons, seeing it as a breach of the social contract.
MCLENNAN, supra note 9, at 40-41 (citing a 1788 editorial in a Pennsylvania news-
paper).
92. WINES & DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 66 ("It is our opinion that the parent of a child
who falls into crime should be compelled, except in peculiar cases, to pay the cost
of its maintenance in a preventive or reformatory institution, or, in default, be
deprived of his liberty and forced to toil to that end.").
93. Rothman, supra note 58, at 1O9.
94. For a broader overview of the types of prison labor, see MCLENNAN, supra note 9,
at 103-04. See also MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT
LEASING IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1866-1928 at 14-15 (1996); Harry Elmer Barnes,
The Economics of American Penology as Illustrated by the Experience of the State of
Pennsylvania, 29 J. POL. ECON. 617, 624-25 (1921).
95. A Study of Prison Industry: History, Components, and Goals, AM. CORR. ASS'N 4
(1986), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/004194.pdf (describing
state use as the "most prevalent" form of prison labor in the United States during
the past half century).
96. MCKELVEY, supra note 39, at 191.
97. DE BEAUMONT & DE TOQUEVILLE, supra note 59, at 7.
98. WINES & DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 248-49.
99. Id. at 255.
1OO. Id. at 88.
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used the convict leasing system to avoid any state financial responsibility for
prisoners,10' and after the Civil War leasing was so widely used that "Southern
states had no prisons to speak of."'0 2
Leasing became a profit center for Southern states. Though these states ini-
tially turned to convict leasing to avoid the costs of rebuilding and maintaining
their prisons, leasing soon proved incredibly lucrative.' 3 By the mid-188os,
"practically every [Southern] state was reaping a clear profit from its con-
victs."'1 4 In Alabama, for example, from 1876 until 1928 the state consistently
made money on its prison population. 5 In 1898, income from convict leasing
made up an astounding seventy-three percent of total state revenue6
Even outside the South, prison labor was profitable.'0 7 States used the pro-
spect of prison labor revenues to guide their decisions about how to budget for
new state systems. Wines and Dwight observed that in "prison reports and oth-
er documents relating to prisons [o]ne string is harped upon, ad nauseam-
money, money, money. Where one word is spoken for reformation, hundreds
are spoken for revenue." ' 8 Wines and Dwight reported that the goal of New
York's prison system, according to a man who worked there more than thirty
years, was "to make the prison pay its way." The authors editorialized, writing
that the statement was too mild: instead, the goal was "to show as large a sur-
plus revenue as possible."'0 9 When New Jersey was considering a prison labor
1oi. See generally MANCINI, supra note 94.
102. Id. at i. Three Southern states had no state prison before the Civil War-North
Carolina and South Carolina, id. at 199, and Florida, id. at 184. Those that did have
antebellum prisons found them either completely destroyed (e.g., Georgia, id. at
82) or severely degraded both structurally and financially after the Civil War.
When Mississippi was faced with the prospect of repairing its penitentiary in 1876,
for example, it opted to avoid the expense of these repairs and instead leased its
entire convict population to the Hamilton and Hebron Company. This company,
in turn, "sublease[d] the convicts at even higher rates, and no check was main-
tained over the cruel fate of the penal slaves." MCKELVEY, supra note 39, at 174-75.
The bright side was that there was no overcrowding in Mississippi-but only be-
cause there was no physical prison there. Id. at 184.
103. See, e.g., MANCINI, supra note 94, at 132-33 (discussing the cases of Mississippi, Al-
abama, and Arkansas); see also id. at 119 (discussing Arkansas and noting that the
initial lease contract emphasized that the state would not pay any expenses relat-
ing to its prisoners).
104. Blake McKelvey, A Half Century of Southern Penal Exploitation, 13 Soc. FORCES 112
(1934).
105. MANCINI, supra note 94, at iol.
lO6. Id. at 112. Even in 1915, when the size of Alabama's budget was much larger, con-
vict leasing still provided the state with a sixth of its revenues. Id. at 119.
107. MCLENNAN, supra note 9, at 134-36.
108. WINES & DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 289.
1O9. Id. at 288.
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system, "financial considerations were the most potent in effecting the
change."....
The use of prison labor was not to last, however. By the turn of the twenti-
ety century, "the day of self-supporting prisons was passing,"' though it would
not be fully extinguished until the early 194os, when interstate trade in prison-
made goods was effectively outlawed. Opposition to prison labor came from
"free" industry and organized labor, who argued that the low wages from prison
work constituted unfair competition."2 In 1887, these forces gained their first
significant victory when federal prison labor contracting was made illegal."3
States followed the federal government, and by 1895 "almost half the states...
place[d] restrictions of some sort or other on the contracting out of prison la-
borers to private enterprise.""14 When states could no longer use prison labor,
the balance sheet for prisons went from surpluses to "enormous deficits.""'
Federal statutes passed during the Great Depression restricted the market for
and use of prison labor even further, culminating in 1940 with the virtual pro-
hibition of prison products in interstate commerce." '6 This left goods and ser-
vices produced for government consumption as the only outlet for prison la-
bor."7 These changes made state prisons dependent on funds from state
governments to a degree that was not foreseen when prison labor made prisons
self-sufficient. "[Giradually the old American tradition of prisons supported by
the labor of their inmates gave place to a new standard of convicts working to
learn trades but avoiding the public markets.""' 8
110. Id. at 53.
111. MCKELVEY, supra note 39, at lO6.
112. Id. at 93.
113. MCLENNAN, supra note 9, at 184. Though California banned convict leasing in
1882 by constitutional amendment and enacting legislation, prisoners still worked
for private contractors for many years after that. See, e.g., JOHN SUMMERFIELD
ENOS, SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA 124 (State Office, Sacramento, 1887) ("Practically this idea and or-
der has not been carried out, and the old contract system is still as active as it ever
was, although under a different name. Instead of contracting to pay so much per
day for convict labor, the firms who now make use of a State institution contract
to pay so much for the product of that labor.").
114. MCLENNAN, supra note 9, at 185. McLennan notes, however, that in some places
where contracting was formally outlawed, "actual abolition took longer." Id. at
187.
115. MCKELVEY, supra note 39, at 98.
116. Frank T. Flynn, The Federal Government and the Prison-Labor Problem in the
States. L The Aftermath of Federal Restrictions, 24 SOC. SERV. REV. 19 (1950).
117. MCLENNAN, supra note 9, at 197-200.
118. MCKELVEY, supra note 39, at 104.
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In sum, states agreed to administer state prisons during a time when there
was only an economic upside to doing so. The problem of the correctional free
lunch lay dormant until the scale of imprisonment exploded in the 197OS." But
long before the 1970s, the groundwork for the correctional free lunch had al-
ready been laid. By agreeing to build and maintain state prisons almost a hun-
dred years earlier, and holding fast to this agreement when the underlying eco-
nomics changed, states left themselves exposed to a potentially ruinous fiscal
commitment.
IV. How PRISON COSTS AFFECTED PRISON GROWTH: HISTORICAL COUNTER-
EXAMPLES FROM PENNSYLVANIA AND THE CAROLINAS
What would have happened if the economic benefits to prison labor had
been captured not by the state, but by local governments? Alternatively, what if
there had not been any economic benefits to prison labor? This Part examines
two natural experiments where changes in the economic benefits of prison la-
bor altered the size and shape of state prison systems. Part IV.A examines the
history of South Carolina and North Carolina, where counties fought the state
for the benefits from prison labor, resulting in very long sentences being served
at the county level. This suggests that state prison systems might have remained
small if the cost differential between local and state dispositions had also re-
mained small. Part IV.B explores Pennsylvania's experience. Due to the ineffi-
ciencies of the isolated system of prison labor used there, as well as early moves
to ban the sale of prison-made goods, Pennsylvania prison labor never made
much money. Rather, Pennsylvania's prisons were a drain on the state budget.
Pennsylvania's response was telling. State facilities did not subsidize the costs of
prisoners; instead, sentencing counties paid houses of incarceration for the up-
keep of each prisoner they sent. Both examples hint that the economic benefits
of prison labor were crucial to establishing the size and scope of state prison
systems.
A. Carolina County Road Gangs: The State-Local Battle for an Economic As-
set
In North and South Carolina, local governments desperately wanted to
capture the economic benefits of as much prison labor as possible. As a result,
they were constantly reclaiming locally-sentenced convicts from the state prison
system." Their experiences highlight how different economic arrangements
119. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 141.
120. County road gangs were not originally just a Southern phenomenon, and, as late
as 1923, all states except Rhode Island had laws authorizing county convict work
on public highways. See, e.g., JESSE F. STEINER & ROY M. BROWN, THE NORTH
CAROLINA CHAIN GANG: A STUDY OF COUNTY CONVICT ROAD WORK 3-4 (Negro
Universities Press, 1970) (1927). In fact, not all Southern states had county road
crews: Virginia had a state road force. Jane Zimmerman, The Penal Reform
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shape state prison usage, suggesting that, if prisoners were an economic benefit,
counties might retain more of them. In the immediate years following state pe-
nal centralization in the Carolinas, state control was not seen as a correctional
free lunch (that is, a way for counties to get the states to absorb the cost of im-
prisonment), but rather as a way for states to seize economic assets from locali-
ties.
The relationship between Southern convict labor and slavery is no coinci-
dence. The Thirteenth Amendment, after all, did not and does not end all forms
of slavery-it allows slavery as a condition of "punishment for crime." '' The
antebellum Southern economy was based on the enslavement of African Ameri-
cans, and many authors have argued that "the convict lease system was a func-
tional replacement for slavery."'22 One author goes so far as to say that prison
gangs in the American South "took their inspiration from slavery." '23 To this
day, of course, African Americans are disproportionately represented in our
country's prisons, and the racial origins of our correctional policies are widely
discussed (though perhaps not as widely as they should be). 2 4 Looking only at
the economic considerations of prison labor, particularly in the South, presents
an incomplete picture of why prison labor policies enjoyed support. Surely part
of the impetus behind chain gangs was a return, in some sense, to a racialized
form of social control, since chain gangs, with their collection of uniformed
prisoners chained together in hard labor, were "more disgraceful and humiliat-
ing than a sentence to the state prison."'25 Nevertheless, an exploration of how
these policies were implemented tells us what factors lay behind the control of
convict populations. Why did localities want responsibility for prisoners when
the state was willing to take them?
Movement in the South During the Progressive Era, u89o-1917, 17 J. S. HIST. 462, 470-
71 (1951) (internal citations omitted).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1, cl. 2.
122. Christopher R. Adamson, Punishment After Slavery: Southern State Penal Systems,
1865-1890, 30 SOC. PROBS. 555 (1983). However, it is also true that Northern prisons
relied so heavily on the use of convict labor that "the framers of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments were apparently well aware [that] an unqualified,
truly universal, proscription of slavery and involuntary servitude would have effec-
tively rendered most Northern penal systems illegal." MCLENNAN, supra note 9, at
85.
123. Rotman, supra note 70, at 157. For more on the comparison between state road
gangs and slavery, see Alex Lichtenstein, Good Roads and Chain Gangs in the Pro-
gressive South: "The Negro Convict is a Slave," 59 J. S. HIST. 85, 91 (1993) (arguing
that penal road crews reproduced the slave system both by using conscripted la-
bor and in the "benign paternalism" embedded in the idea that such labor was for
the convict's own benefit).
124. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN
AGE OF COLOR BLINDNESS (2010).
125. STEINER & BROWN, supra note 120, at 6.
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The answer is that prison labor was profitable. After the Civil War, with the
end of all non-penal forms of slavery, the value of prison labor was evident, and
state governments in the South jealously guarded prisoners-and their eco-
nomic potential-from localities. In 1875 the Governor of Alabama, George
Huston, was upset that judges had discretionary power to send convicts to
counties, "because he wanted them delivered to the penitentiary where the state
could take direct advantage of their labor ... .""6 In Georgia, the state outlawed
county leasing of misdemeanants in 1879, but counties, seeking economic bene-
fits, openly flouted the law for the next thirty years. 12 7 Only when the state pris-
ons abolished their own leasing programs and instead sent state prisoners to
counties for public works did county leasing come to an end."
By the late 1920s, Southern states had phased out the practice of leasing
convicts to private industry, in part due to the well-publicized brutality of the
practice. In the intervening years, though, localities in two states fought bitterly
for control over prisoners. In other words, there was nothing inevitable about
state control over incarceration. In these two states, state control was decidedly
unwelcome.
1. The South Carolina Experience
South Carolina's penological history from the Civil War until 1916 is one
that has been described as a "circle" going from county control to state centrali-
zation and back to county control via work gangs.'2 9 State control over the
county-dominated system was established after the Civil War, but within fifty
years counties were not only sentencing prisoners to county labor for terms ex-
ceeding ten years, they were taking prisoners sentenced to state prisons-
including those with life terms-back to the county in order to work them on
the roads. This serves as a notable counterexample to the correctional free
lunch: counties that saw economic benefits from incarceration starved state
governments of prisoners.
Before the Civil War, South Carolina housed prisoners in local jails; there
were no state facilities. 30 Prisoners in local jails were either serving long-term
sentences or were awaiting trial. Convicts serving short-term sentences "did not
exist": misdemeanants were fined or flogged. 3' Only after the Civil War did
126. MANCINI, supra note 94, at 1O.
127. Id. at 222.
128. Id. at 223.
129. ALBERT D. OLIPHANT, THE EVOLUTION OF THE PENAL SYSTEM OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FROM 1866 TO 1916 at 13 (1916).
130. Id. at 3 ("Until after the War Between the Sections persons sentenced to impris-
onment by the courts of South Carolina were kept in the jail maintained by the
county in which they were convicted.").
131. Id.
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South Carolina begin to exert state control, passing an act to build a state peni-
tentiary on the theory that lawbreakers violated state law, not county law.' The
penitentiary system, however, was designed to be, in the words of Governor
Wade Hampton, "self-supporting as far as possible."'33 The state began a convict
leasing system in 1877, leasing all state prisoners except those convicted of
"murder, statutory assault, arson or manslaughter."'3 4
South Carolina counties slowly began to claw back control of sentenced
prisoners from the state government. In late 1885, the legislature passed a statute
"permitting counties and municipalities to use convicts sentenced for not more
than 90 days to work on their roads and streets,"'35 an attempt to reassert local
control over convicts.' 36 As the law developed over the next decades, counties
won increasing control over prisoners and were given first crack at retaining
workable prisoners while returning "ungovernable" convicts to the state.13 7 By
1903, sentencing limits for prisoners under local control had increased dramati-
cally: prisoners "whose sentence did not exceed lo years" (except those sen-
tenced for statutory assault) could be sentenced to hard labor in the counties.13
By 1911, even this limit was removed: no sentence length was too long to be
served locally, at hard labor.'39 Finally, in 1914 the state passed a law authorizing
counties to reassert control over any of its sentenced prisoners in order to work
them on the chain gangs; more than half the prisoners subsequently taken by
counties had been sentenced to life terms.' 4° By 1916, the system could be sum-
marized as follows: county supervisors could "take from the penitentiary any
convicts they choose, convicted in their counties, and to return them [to the
state] if they see fit."14 ' Under this regime, more than eighty percent of the
state's prisoners were under county control.' 42 The reason was economic-
prison labor was valuable. 43
132. Id. (noting that county finances were depleted by the Civil War).
133. Id. at 4.
134. Id. at 5.
135. Id. at 8.
136. Id. at 9.
137. Id. at o.
138. Id. at 11.
139. Id. at 12.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 13.
142. Id. at 14; see also McKelvey, supra note 104, at 118 (reporting that, in 1915, 1500 out
of 2000 of South Carolina's state convicts were working in county chain gangs).
143. OLIPHANT, supra note 129, at 13 ("The marked tendency to divorce convicts from
State control to county control and the effort to make money for the State from
the labor of convicts under its control were the doubtful foundation which carried
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2. The North Carolina Experience
In North Carolina, prison labor at the county level dated back to the years
following national independence; from 1787 to 1797 sheriffs could hire out any
prisoner unable to pay costs assessed by the court.'44 After the Civil War, the
legislature authorized road crew sentences for non-capital crimes; the crews
were to work "in chain gangs on the public roads of the county or on any rail-
road or other work of internal improvement in the state" for a term "not to ex-
ceed one year." 145
As in South Carolina, the local leasing power was gradually extended to
cover a greater number of sentenced prisoners. In the mid-187os, a new statute
extended convict leasing to cover "any person convicted of any criminal offense
in any court, and to those liable for costs.' 1 6 A few years later, officials-county
commissioners as well as mayors of cities and towns-not only had the power
to use the labor of "all persons imprisoned in the county jails" including those
who could not pay fines and costs, but also to lease labor to "individuals or cor-
porations" unrelated to public works and roads.'47 This power was limited
slightly in 1879, when local officials were required to obtain judicial authoriza-
tion to hire out jail inmates to individuals and corporations' 48 In practice, how-
ever, one author observed that a provision to lease out prisoners to private in-
terests was seldom used, since counties preferred to use convict labor to build
roads.
49
The role of the North Carolina state government in criminal justice was
thus quite limited. North Carolina, like South Carolina, had no state prison
prior to the Civil War.' ° The state eventually built a prison during Reconstruc-
tion,'5' but counties siphoned off so many prisoners for their road crews that
most of the superstructure of the State's penal system when the State board of
charities and corrections was created in 1915.").
144. STEINER & BROWN, supra note 120, at 18. This law was repealed in 1797, replaced in
1831 by a racialized system that exempted whites, specifying that if "any free Negro
or free person of color" could not pay a fine imposed, the sheriff could hire him
out "to any person who will pay the fine for his services for the shortest space of
time." Id. at 19 (internal citations omitted). The "great majority" of prisoners in
both the state and county systems were African Americans, "especially in the
county chain gangs." Id. at 14-15.
145. Id. at 21 (internal citations omitted).
146. Id. at 21-22.
147. Id. at 23.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 48.
150. Id. at 11.
151. MANCINI, supra note 94, at 199.
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only those unable to work-"the decrepit and diseased criminal offenders"-
were housed there.' In 1889, the legislature authorized judges to impose local
hard labor for men with sentences of up to ten years; the result was that the
state prison population declined from 1300 prisoners in 189o to just 66o in
1905.153 By 19o8, the North Carolina Superintendent of the Prison reported that
counties had complete control over the state's convict population, arguing that
the state prison system was, essentially, a collection of individual county sys-
tems:
[Elach county is in supreme control of its own gang, prescribes its own
rules of discipline, of clothing, of feeding, of guarding, of quartering
and of working. Consequently, in addition to what is known as the
State's Prison, North Carolina has forty wholly independent State pris-
ons, under forty separate and distinct managements, with forty differ-
ent and distinct sets of rules and regulations, and over which there is
absolutely no State supervision and inspection. 154
North Carolina did not so much as supervise county camps and jails until
1917, '55 and there was no enforcement of state standards until 1925: "prior to 1925
the state authorities had no power to enforce their recommendations when bad
conditions were found in these county convict camps."'' 6
In 1926, there were nearly twice as many prisoners on North Carolina coun-
ty road gangs as in state prison.'57 On a commitment basis, ten times as many
convicts were sent to work on county road gangs as prison. The maximum road
gang sentence was up to ten years, and some convicts were sentenced to county
time for offenses as serious as "rape, burglary, assault with intent to kill, and
manslaughter." The ultimate placement of a prisoner was usually left to the dis-
cretion of the superior court judge."58
The economic benefits of prison labor drove sentencing in North Carolina:
counties kept their sentenced prisoners and sent only those who could not work
to the state.'5 9 "Without a doubt the motive underlying the establishment and
152. Zimmerman, supra note 120, at 469 (internal citations omitted). Indeed, in 1894
the Secretary of the State Board of Charity justified the use of chain gangs as re-
lieving the state of the financial burden of a state penitentiary. STEINER & BROWN,
supra note 120, at 35.
153. McKelvey, supra note 104, at 117.
154. STEINER & BROWN, supra note 120, at 39-40 (internal citations omitted).
155. Id. at 65.
156. Id. at 66.
157. Id. at 5.
158. Id.
159. Id. ("It is commonly asserted by the state prison officials that those unfit for hard
labor are committed to their institution while the strong and able-bodied are re-
quired to work out their sentences on country roads.")
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the continuance of the county chain gang [was] primarily economic," and eco-
nomics dominated "any corrective or reformatory value in such methods of pe-
nal treatment.""'6 Indeed, the leading history of North Carolina chain gangs
suggests that in times with few prisoners, "the local criminal courts tend[ed] to
be looked upon as feeders for the chain gang, and there is evidence in some in-
stances that the mill of criminal justice grinds more industriously when the
convict road force needs new recruits.
'61
B. County Capitation in Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania provides a counterexample to the story in the Carolinas.
Pennsylvania, like other states, used prison labor from the colonial period on-
ward. Prison labor in Pennsylvania, however, did not generate enough revenue
to offset the costs of operation for two reasons: first, prisoners labored in soli-
tary confinement, which was inefficient and costly; and second, the state im-
posed restrictions on the sale of prison-made goods. Because prisoners were not
economic assets, localities did not fight to maintain control of them. Instead,
Pennsylvania controlled its prison population another way. Beginning with the
Walnut Street Jail in the late 1700s, local governments had to pay costs associat-
ed with the prisoners they sent to state facilities. In other words, Pennsylvania
never gave localities a "free lunch."
The development of Pennsylvania's statewide prison system came about as
a result of overcrowding at the Walnut Street Jail.'62 Overcrowding meant less
room for work. By 1825, convict labor met only ten percent of Walnut Street's
costs, and less than ten percent of prisoners were employed.'6 3 By the 1820s,
Walnut Street reverted to an ordinary jail' 6 4 and was replaced by the Eastern
State Penitentiary in Cherry Hill. At Eastern State, prisoners lived and worked
16o. Id. at 6. Although the authors of this study question the economic benefits, find-
ing that the lack of accurate bookkeeping makes such an assessment difficult. Id.
at 7.
161. Id. at 6; see also MCKELVEY, supra note 39, at 168 (discussing that, in places where
sheriffs were paid by the county per prisoner, "[i]t was not unknown for consta-
bles to 'run men in for revenue only'") (internal citations omitted); WINES &
DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 519 (reporting that a respondent to their survey said the
fee system in New Jersey was "tempting to undue exertion to convict, and tempt-
ing to receive rewards from the defendants to favor them").
162. BARNES, supra note 56, at 116 ("[The move towards incarceration] did not bring
about the immediate establishment of a state prison system. Rather the attempt
was made to use the Philadelphia county and city jail as a substitute for a state
prison until by the growth of population and the consequent increase in the
numbers of the delinquent classes, the commonwealth was literally crowded out
of the jail system and into a system of state penitentiaries.").
163. Barnes, supra note 94, at 621 (internal citations omitted).
164. DePuy, supra note 61, at 132.
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in twenty-four-hour isolation. This became known as the "Pennsylvania" (or
"separate") system, as opposed to the "Auburn" (or "congregate labor") system
employed at Auburn State Penitentiary in New York, which allowed inmates to
work together during the day before returning alone to their cells at night. The
Pennsylvania system was both "ruinous to the public treasury" and ineffective
at "the reformation of the prisoners."'6 5 Part of the expense was due to the ar-
chitecture-the need for separate workspaces, rooms, and even individual exer-
cise yards, for example.'66 Complete isolation also led to overcrowding and an
inability for inmates to work.16 7 Throughout its long history, the Eastern State
Penitentiary "never... earned enough in any year to equal the cost of feeding
and clothing the convicts."'68 Up until the late nineteenth century, when other
prisons had long since turned to the efficiency of mass production and industri-
alized labor, Eastern State prisoners still made handicrafts,'6 9 mostly hosiery,
chairs with cane seating, and cigars. 170
But even the more efficient Pennsylvania prisons did not make money. Af-
ter the Civil War, Pennsylvania's other prison, the Western State Penitentiary,
moved to the congregational labor ("Auburn") system, which allowed prisoners
to work together. 171 Western State was slightly more economical than Eastern
State as a result, but in the sixty years after 1864 it never generated enough reve-
nue to offset building maintenance costs and came nowhere close to offsetting
the cost of officials' salaries. 72
Part of the problem was that Pennsylvania's free (non-incarcerated) labor
movement had been extremely effective in campaigning to limit the production
and sale of goods made with prison labor. 73 An 1897 bill restricting trade in
prison-manufactured goods turned prison labor in the state into a "farce and a
misnomer. '174 By 1909, Pennsylvania led the nation in idle prisoners: "out of the
2,900 idle able-bodied prisoners in the entire United States, no less than 2,073
were listed as being in Pennsylvania.1 ' 75 A 1915 report by the Penal Commission
on the Employment and Compensation of Prisoners was very critical of the
idleness of Pennsylvania prisoners, noting that "[f1rom the financial point of
165. DE BEAUMONT & DE TOQUEVILLE, supra note 59, at 3.
166. McKELVEY, supra note 39, at ii.
167. Id. at 6.
168. BARNES, supra note 56, at 287.
169. MCKELVEY, supra note 39, at 95.
170. Barnes, supra note 94, at 621, 623.
171. Id. at 623.
172. Id. at 640.
173. Id. at 633-34.
174. Id. at 635.
175. Id.
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view no policy could be more silly than that of supporting in idleness the thou-
sands of prisoners which make up the never-ending stream of humanity that
pours through our penal institutions.'
' 76
If its prisons were so expensive, how, then, did Pennsylvania afford them?
Beginning in 1789, with the Walnut Street Jail, Pennsylvania facilities charged
counties for the inmates they committed on a per capita basis, also known as a
capitation system.1 7 In 1789, when Pennsylvania made the Walnut Street Jail
available for prisoners from across the state, "[tihe expenses of operating the
Philadelphia prison were to be defrayed by the several counties in proportion to
the number of prisoners from each county." 78 As the Pennsylvania system ex-
panded, the state paid salaries in state prisons, but "the expenses of maintaining
and keeping the convicts" continued to be "borne by the respective counties in
which they shall be convicted."' 79 The state did not always have enough money
to cover costs; when it didn't, counties were forced to contribute to make up the
shortfall."'
Most important for this analysis, cost-sharing was seen in Pennsylvania as a
means of controlling prison admissions, with one observer writing that county
payments "to some slight extent tend to reduce criminality, in that it sets a fi-
nancial penalty upon counties which furnish a disproportionate number of
convicts."'' In North and South Carolina, state prison populations were con-
trolled by allowing localities to retain the economic benefits of prisoners. In
Pennsylvania, state prison populations were controlled by charging localities for
the cost of prisoners. In both examples, localities changed their prison usage
when the cost of using them changed.
V. ENVISIONING THE END OF STATE PRISON SUBSIDIES
The primary goal of this Article has been to point out that a state-funded
prison system is neither necessary nor inevitable. By illustrating the difference
between our current system and other possible systems, I hope to begin the dis-
cussion of alternatives. As the prior sections have demonstrated, state prisons
176. BARNES, supra note 56, at 253.
177. See id. at 116 ("In case the proceeds of the labor of the prisoners exceeded the ex-
pense of their maintenance it was ordered that the surplus should be divided in
proportion to the number of prisoners in each county."). Philadelphia also re-
ceived a hundred pounds a year for incidental expenses. DePuy, supra note 61, at
133-34.
178. BARNES, supra note 56, at 116.
179. Id. at 279; see also WINES & DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 294 ("In the Pennsylvania
state prisons, this is even now the method of computation; the government pay-
ing the salaries, and the counties making up any deficit in the cost of subsistence,
[etc.], accruing in the earnings of the convicts.").
180. BARNES, supra note 56, at 281.
181. Id.
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were created in order to provide the rehabilitative options not found in local
jails, and the use of prison labor meant that, far from being a drain, state con-
trol of prisons increased state revenues. Today, though, the rehabilitative effica-
cy of prisons is doubtful,1 s2 and their drain on state finances is undeniable. It no
longer makes sense for state governments to provide localities with unlimited
and fully-subsidized access to state prisons.
In this Part I outline some features of what a non-subsidized system might
look like.' s3 I begin by noting that there are still many places where the state
could, and perhaps should, remain involved. Part V.A envisions a system in
which the state no longer subsidizes prison admissions but nevertheless contin-
ues to regulate its existing prison facilities. Part V.B discusses the ways in which
a non-subsidized state system would make local policy choices more transpar-
ent and sincere. Part V.C anticipates some concerns about unequal redistribu-
tion of resources. I conclude that concerns about redistribution are misplaced:
we currently have an unfair system with locally-driven policies. Taking the state
out of the equation would take away no tools for curing inequalities and would,
in fact, make these inequalities easier to diagnose.
A. Ending the Correctional Free Lunch
Because there are several ways in which state governments are involved
with prisons, there are several ways in which state governments' roles might be
reduced. State governments generally build prisons, supervise them, and, of
course, subsidize all expenses associated with prisoners. This section focuses on
the last item: ending the prison subsidy.
There is little reason to destroy existing state facilities or to require local
governments to duplicate them. Prison infrastructure is a sunk cost. Prisons are
specialized buildings that are typically removed from population centers, mak-
ing them difficult to repurpose. As buildings need to be upgraded or replaced,
however, states should consider carefully whether they should pay for new con-
struction. For the reasons specified in Part I, local governments should internal-
ize as many costs associated with corrections as possible.
Similarly, state governments should continue to monitor and regulate pris-
ons to ensure that conditions are humane and that programming is effective.
Indeed, Wines and Dwight suggested almost 150 years ago that state authority
could co-exist with local administration.18 4 Schools provide a ready example of
how statewide requirements can be combined with local administration. There
are statewide requirements that children attend school (though these, too, were
182. See, e.g., Lynne M. Vieratis, Tomislav V. Kovandzic, & Thomas B. Marvell, The
Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: Evidence from State Panel Data, 1974-2002, 6
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 589 (2007).
183. For more on the policy implications of ending the state prison subsidy, see Ball,
supra note 6.
184. WINES & DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 84.
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not present at the country's founding),'5 and there are various ways in which
the state ensures certain minimum standards of quality. Teachers are creden-
tialed by the state, there are statewide tests designed to measure how schools are
performing, and there are audits of schools. The state sets performance metrics,
but local districts experiment with how to meet those metrics-via pedagogical
approaches and other policies and procedures. 6 Local differences don't repre-
sent different goals but, instead, represent differences about the most effective
means to attain common goals. Crucially, though, states themselves do not ad-
minister K-12 education. Local governments do.'
Criminal enforcement and sentencing are similar in some ways. The state
sets baseline rules about legality through statutes. Different sentencing out-
comes might be seen to represent disagreements about the most effective means
to achieve the same goal-public safety. States could ensure that corrections of-
ficers are licensed and that facilities meet certain standards of quality. States
might also collect and disseminate criminal justice information, publishing rel-
evant county statistics the way they publish scores on achievement tests. Voters
could then use this information to reward or punish local officials responsible
for the policies that affect these statistics. The state could also reserve the right
to step in to maintain a criminal justice floor, taking over the administration of
criminal justice directly in extreme cases, the way it takes over certain wholly
dysfunctional schools.' Regulating at the state level would ensure that regula-
tory bodies were relatively independent, and therefore less subject to capture by
local officials.
When it comes to paying for prisons, however, states should follow the
Pennsylvania example s9 and stop distorting the cost of prison, either by ending
185. See, e.g., Charles Woltz, Compulsory Attendance at School, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 4 (1955).
186. For the difficulties this can engender, see Heather C. Hill, Policy Is Not Enough:
Language and the Interpretation of State Standards, 38 AM. EDUC. RESEARCH J. 289
(2001).
187. States do, however, administer the more "professionalized" and specialized educa-
tion at colleges and universities, suggesting that for special needs prisoners, such
as those who are elderly or mentally ill, states might take a more active role.
188. See, e.g., Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III, State Takeovers of School Dis-
tricts: Race and the Equal Protection Clause, 42 IND. L. REV. 343 (2009).
189. The capitation system also operated, to a certain extent, in other states. Wines and
Dwight observed that New York penitentiaries-intermediate institutions be-
tween state prisons and county jails-were "all local institutions, created by spe-
cial statutes and managed by the authorities of the counties in which they are situ-
ated," even though they received "inmates from the adjoining counties." WINES &
DWIGHT, supra note 65, at 57. They were, however, compensated for the costs of
boarding those prisoners, and they also were allowed to retain "the avails of their
labor during their imprisonment." Id. In the Illinois system of the late i8oos, local
jailers were "remunerated by fees and not by salaries. The sheriff boards the pris-
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the prison subsidy or equally subsidizing all the alternatives to prison. Every
state is like Pennsylvania now: prison labor no longer supports the cost of pris-
ons.'9° Because prison is not the only way to respond to crime (even in the con-
text of sentencing), and because prison is expensive, it should not be subsidized
relative to other options absent some proof that it is superior. States could ex-
periment with variations on this general goal, for example paying most or all of
the costs associated with serious offenses (e.g., murder), but paying none of the
costs for lower-level offenses eligible for probation. Ending the prison subsidy
would leave the buildings and administration at the state level but merely
change the price paid by localities. It would be a change both simple and pro-
found, as discussed below.
B. Taking Local Policies Seriously
Currently, local policies on prison usage diverge, with all of a state's citizens
paying only for those local policies that use state prison. Ending the prison sub-
sidy would take these locally-expressed policy choices seriously by forcing local-
ities to pay for them. One might expect prison usage to decrease as the price
paid by individual counties increased, and, indeed, that is likely to be the case.
However, it is at least possible, given the heterogeneity of local preferences, that
individual counties might decide that their prison usage is, in fact, worth the
added expense and continue with business as usual. The goal of removing the
subsidy is about ensuring that the costs of prison are borne by those who
choose to use them. Allowing localities to retain the discretion and autonomy
they presently have, while making them more responsible for the financial con-
sequences of these decisions, would have four main advantages: it would make
decisions more transparent; it would make them more meaningful; it would
make them more likely to yield positive and negative examples; and it would be
more in line with certain constitutional values.
The first advantage is transparency. The United States has simply gotten
too populous, and state governments too complex, for citizens to understand,
at the state level, the relevant causes of crime and the effects of policies designed
to address them. The first census in 1790 recorded a population of 3,929,214;'9' as
of 2010, more than half the states in the country had more people than that. 92
California alone has several counties with more people than even the largest
oners at so much per week. Clothing is supplied to prisoners, when necessary, at
the expense of the counties." Id. at 322-23.
190. Even if the legal and regulatory framework of the last hundred years were to be
unwound, macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. have changed. The unskilled
factory labor suitable for prisoners is no longer in high demand.
191. Measuring America: The Decennial Censuses From 179o to 2000, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU 141 (2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/polo2marv.pdf.
192. Resident Population Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
2olocensus/data/apportionment-pop-text.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
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states at the time of the founding, and one county, Los Angeles, is more popu-
lous than all but nine states in the union today.'93 Disaggregating the criminal
justice policies of populous states into local criminal justice systems would
make the relationship between policies and outcomes easier to discern. 194 As Li-
sa Miller has argued, the problem is that there is no accountability
in a political system that diffuses policy issues across a wide range of
venues, allocating fiscal resources and budgetary power to the higher
levels of government but providing virtually no channels of accounta-
bility for whether the manner in which that power is exercised actually
ameliorates crime and violence in local communities. 95
In a local system, citizens would vote locally to reinforce or replace the people
who developed and enforced those policies. Given that so much of criminal jus-
tice policy is already local, keeping track of the budgetary implications of those
policies by locality makes good sense. Even if a voter is presently dissatisfied
with a state's criminal justice system, how can she choose the particular bums to
kick out of office when the system is so complicated?' 96
A second benefit would be to make criminal justice decisions more mean-
ingful, especially those grounded in retribution. Perhaps because there is no so-
cial science consensus on effective criminal justice policy-or perhaps because
criminal justice policies are not based on social science-much of criminal jus-
tice policy now is justified by appeals to retribution. 97 But retribution and its
193. As of the 2010 census, 39 counties had populations of more than one-million peo-
ple, and the most populous 150 counties (out of 3221) contained about half the
country's population. Centers of Population, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010),
http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/docs/cenpop2olo/county/CenPop2olo_Mea
nCO.txt.
194. See LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS
OF CRIME CONTROL 8-11 (20o8) (arguing that local politics allows greater partici-
pation and a more complex discussion of crime than state politics).
195. Lisa L. Miller, The Local and the Legal: American Federalism and the Carceral State,
10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 725, 727 (2011).
196. Stephanos Bibas has also argued that localism allows "outsiders" (ordinary citi-
zens) to more easily access and monitor the "insiders" who design and implement
policies, ensuring that the resulting policies more closely map onto "the public's
sense of justice." Bibas, supra note 55, at 52.
197. The leading researcher on the relationship between community notions of desert
and the execution of criminal punishment is Paul Robinson. See, e.g., PAUL H.
ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE
PUNISHED How MUCH? (2008); Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance
and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007); Paul H. Robin-
son, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling
Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1o89 (2o11). For a critical view of Robinson's work, see
Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2013).
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variants'9s rely on social norms, the expressive value of condemning offenders,
and/or the role of making victims whole. These norms and values have local
variations, and their expression would be more meaningful if their costs were
borne wholly by the people expressing them. Local criminal justice would iso-
late who is speaking-and who is wronged-with greater precision than
statewide criminal justice.' 99 While counties are no less an abstraction than
states, they are at least abstractions where individual voices make up a greater
percentage of the whole.
Consider this case of sincerity. To pay for a capital trial and its appeals,
Quitman County, Mississippi, raised its taxes and took out a loan. Eventually,
because one defendant was reindicted and tried twice, the county paid for three
trials. "Taxes were raised for three years, and it took the county more than five
years to retire the loan used to cover expenses."" °° The costs of the trial were
clear, yet county residents were willing to pay them. The decision to seek the
death penalty was one with broad community support. Contrast this with a re-
cent case in Riverside County, California, where the district attorney spent pub-
lic money seeking capital punishment for a defendant who had already been
sentenced to death in Idaho.2"' The DA received local political benefits without
the county having to bear all of the costs, but the move was purely expressive,
since the defendant had already received a death sentence. It is more difficult to
isolate whether this expressive benefit was worth the cost to the local constitu-
ency. When citizens make policy choices with a willingness to absorb their true
costs, those choices are more likely to reflect beliefs that are sincerely held. De-
cisions that cost less mean less.
198. For my views on expressive retribution and how it relates to the role of the jury in
sentencing, see W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeter-
minate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 923-26
(2009).
199. I note, again, that the local agencies-not state agencies-are already responsible
for investigating, arresting, prosecuting, and, in some states, sentencing offenders,
even though trials (when there are trials) are between individuals and the state (or
commonwealth). The point here, then, is to put the proper nametag on the arm of
government executing state laws-albeit state laws that permit a wide number of
charges, or none at all. For a more detailed suggestion of how criminal justice sys-
tems can more readily accommodate the founding tradition of local morality, see,
for example, Stephanos Bibas, supra note 55, at 109-127.
200. Poor County Forced to Finance Killers' Appeals, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1999),
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/mar/28/news/mn-21958.
201. John Asbury, Cost of Death for Duncan Questioned, RIVERSIDE PRESS ENTERPRISE,
(Apr. 20, 2010) (citing the cost as $167,ooo and counting). The man in question
later plead guilty and received a California sentence of life without possibility of
parole. Associated Press, Idaho Killer Duncan Pleads Guilty to 1997 Calif Murder,
KOMO NEWS, (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/nl8o44o69
.html.
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The third advantage of decentralization is that it would allow for experi-
mentation. Allowing greater local control would make sense for the same rea-
son that federalism makes sense.2"2 Society can learn from local experiments,
and communities can compete for citizens who then vote with their feet. A local
approach could tailor incarceration to local preferences. Punitive localities
could-within the confines of the Eighth Amendment-pursue harsher pun-
ishments in the belief that punishment deters. 03 Rehabilitative localities could
address underlying risks and needs in the belief that criminals are made, not
born.
For prisoners serving indeterminate sentences, local preferences might af-
fect length of time served in a manner that reflects local preferences. Parole
boards measure an offender's readiness to return to society. Most parole boards
are state agencies without local input, even though an offender will be returning
to a particular locality within the state. A local parole board could be more like
a reentry jury, where intimately local issues dominate: the issue of when some-
one can live in a particular part of a state without jeopardizing its safety. 0 4
Fourth, local criminal justice, rather than statewide criminal justice, is more
in line with the values expressed in the Bill of Rights. The Sixth Amendment ju-
ry right specifically calls for a local jury, one not only of the state but also the
202. In suggesting this, I am proposing a doctrine which one might call sub-state fed-
eralism, where the relationship between the state and its counties mirrors that be-
tween the federal government and the states. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (2010).
203. Outside the context of juvenile sentencing, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010) (overturning a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a juve-
nile convicted of a non-homicide offense), however, the Supreme Court has been
extremely reluctant to overturn lengthy sentences on Eighth Amendment
grounds, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding a sentence of
life without the possibility of parole for a first-time offender convicted of pos-
sessing more than 650 grams of cocaine); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003) (upholding a twenty-five years-to-life sentence for stealing golf clubs under
California's recidivist-enhancement "Three Strikes" law). The problem with the
lack of substantive limitations on the sentencing power, though, already exists in
the current doctrine: it is a problem with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that
state prison subsidies cannot and do not solve.
204. Ball, supra note 54, at 407. Local unification would also help to address the current
disjuncture between parole and probation. Parole schemes are supposed to meas-
ure an individual's readiness to return to society. Parole boards are state agencies
without local input, even though an offender will be returning to a particular
community within the state, not the state in general. To the extent these questions
are normative, it makes more sense to talk about the norms of a particular part of
a state, rather than generalizations about a state as a whole. Again, both states and
counties are abstractions, and both would involve generalizations, but one is at
least slightly more targeted than the other.
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"district wherein the crime shall have been committed."2 ° 5 This is part of the
realm of local values that the jury is meant to vindicate: placing popular limits
on state power." 6 Juries enable local citizens to control the application and pri-
orities of law enforcement: "thus, the jury [is] our best assurance that law and
justice accurately reflect[] the morals, values, and common sense of the people
asked to obey the law."2"7 These local limits were more effective during the
founding era given that law enforcement was intensely local,"°8 made up of local
citizen constables rather than professional police forces. °9 Under the founding
205. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For an exhaustive history of the vicinage requirement, see
Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801 (1976). For more on the im-
portance of locality in minimizing punitiveness and racial disparities in punish-
ment), see Stuntz, supra note 28, at 2035.
206. See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 157 (2004) (arguing that in the
early history of the United States, and by its founders' design, "[t]he principal de-
vice expressing popular control over ordinary law.., was the jury").
207. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 28 (2000); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Princi-
ples, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 818 (1994) (arguing that civil damages for Fourth
Amendment violations were part of the jury's role in setting criminal justice prior-
ities). The grand jury requirement of the Fifth Amendment also involves ideas of
local citizen control. See Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There
Room for Democracy in Our Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002)
("Grand juries can also help to legitimize the criminal justice system by imbuing
the participants-the witnesses, the grand jurors, and perhaps even the defend-
ants themselves-with a sense of procedural justice.").
208. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 86, at 1248 ("Crime victims had to bear the expense of
prosecution in the first instance and therefore had a strong incentive to prosecute
locally if at all.").
209. For a survey of the ways in which police practices have changed since the Framers'
generation, see, for example, Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Princi-
ples, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 830-838 (1994). Professor Steiker focuses on the rise of
professional police forces, as opposed to the amateur policing at the framing, and
concluding that "[our twentieth-century police and even our contemporary
sense of 'policing' would be utterly foreign to our colonial forebears." Id. at 830.
In investigation, for example, there was almost no discretion. See Wesley M. Oli-
ver, The Modern History of Probable Cause, 78 TENN. L. REV. 377, 390 (2011) ("State
officers exercised almost no discretion in the investigatory or prosecutorial pro-
cess. The constable's role in the criminal case ended with the arrest and any search
that accompanied it. The magistrate was the only participant in the criminal jus-
tice system expected to question suspects. The constable was not expected to
question the suspect.").
Courts also bear a strong mark of localism: they emerged at the local and
municipal level, even though they are enforcing state law. See Lynn Langton &
Thomas H. Cohen, State Court Organization, 1987-2004, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1 (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco87o4.pdf. As of
2004, only ten court systems were unified. Id. at 6. This is a self-designation, how-
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model, the jury (us) protects the people (us) from the constable (also us). But
we are the people in a particular local community-not one of millions in a
state.
C Are Prison Subsidies Redistributive?
Even if one accepts the administrative-based arguments against the present
system of state prison subsidies, one might argue that there are reasons ground-
ed in redistribution to subsidize prisons. The argument might be made as fol-
lows: although it might be unfair for one area to subsidize the prison-using pol-
icies of another, it is arguably just as unfair to saddle a crime-ridden area with
the sole responsibility to pay for its crime problem, especially if crime rates and
poverty rates are positively correlated. In other words, would paying for prisons
bankrupt poor cities and counties?
This argument depends on demonstrating that crime is what drives prison
usage and that prison does not increase crime. Briefly, crime and prison usage
are not necessarily linked at the local level; crime variations explain very little of
the variation in new felon admissions."' There is also evidence that prison is, in
fact, criminogenic"' So if crime does not necessarily have to result in prison
sentences, then eliminating prison subsidies isn't necessarily condemning
crime-ridden areas. If crime does drive prison admissions but prisons are crim-
inogenic, then imprisonment will contribute to future crime (and prison) prob-
lems, and also should not be subsidized.
This underscores a basic point: prison subsidies are not crime-fighting sub-
sidies. If the problem is crime, we should provide resources to high-crime areas;
but these resources should not only take the form of free access to state prisons.
Localities should be given crime-fighting grants that they can use to implement
whatever criminal justice policies they deem necessary." '
The problem is that localities currently have unequal resources to fight
crime. Money for crime fighting does not necessarily follow crime levels: more
often it is disbursed on the basis of population, or to fund particular projects, or
on the basis of financial contributions to the state's general fund. In fact, part of
the goal of this Article is to highlight that the money we spend on prisons is
ever: "[n]o state court system actually meets all of the criteria for total unifica-
tion." Id. at 6 n.5. Payment also varies: Illinois funds most of its local courts with
state monies, id. at 1, while New York Town and Village Justice Courts are funded
at the county level, id. at 5.
210. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 41; see also SCHEINGOLD, supra note 53, at ix-x, 48-52.
211. Cullen et al., supra note 51, at 50-51. This, of course, does not account for the inca-
pacitation argument in favor of prison, but that, in turn, depends in some ways
on the marginal costs and benefits of prisons. Prisons might be useful if they are
used sparingly, but they might also reach a point of diminishing returns when
used too much.
212. I have developed this idea further in Ball, supra note 6.
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money we do not spend fighting crime or preventing it. We do, in fact, spend
millions of dollars on people from poor, crime-ridden areas. It's just that we do
so in the form of building and staffing prisons. '3 Jurisdictions that currently cut
their prison usage do not get money back from the state-the state pockets the
savings. This gives localities no incentive to decrease prison usage, especially
given that alternatives to prison such as community supervision or treatment
are typically paid out of local budgets. If localities kept the money they saved,
treating prison dollars as a funding source, they could reallocate money towards
more cost-effective means of promoting public safety. 14
The issue of state underinvestment raises a larger question, however: why
redistribute only in the form of prison beds? If areas suffer increased crime be-
cause the state has failed to provide them with adequate schools, aid to needy
families, and the like, why not address these root causes and demand that the
state fund these programs? Isn't the real problem that we have impoverished
cities and counties to begin with? Prison is not the cause of inequality; it is
simply where these inequalities make themselves manifest. We should focus on
inequality when it occurs, not simply once prison comes into the equation. If
poverty is the problem, tackling poverty is the solution. Funding prison to ac-
count for some of poverty's effects leaves poverty itself entrenched. Prison is not
the place to equalize state underinvestment.
CONCLUSION
Reducing or eliminating state governments' role in imprisonment does not
mean the end of either criminal punishment or incarceration. Instead, it simply
means that these practices should be reoriented towards localities. This sugges-
tion is perhaps less radical than it seems-it returns local concerns to the cen-
tral role they played at the time of the founding, when criminal justice was ad-
ministered locally, with greater citizen involvement. We have moved away from
that. Criminal justice is now impersonal, outside any notion of "community."
There is no hope of it being anything other than anonymous at the state level.
Localism might rehumanize the actors in different roles in the system, as well as
those who are imprisoned by it.
This Article has explored how we might return to these local principles by
asking a basic question: what should be the state's role in imprisonment? In this
Article I have attempted to show how state participation is not always necessary
and how, in some ways, it might be contraindicated. I have proceeded by taking
as a given local control of certain functions-jail, law enforcement, prosecution,
213. See, e.g., Spatial Information Design Lab, The Pattern, COLUMBIA UNIV. GRADUATE
SCH. OF ARCHITECTURE 37 (2008), http://www.spatialinformationdesignlab.org/
MEDIA/ThePattern.pdf (mapping "Million Dollar Blocks," city blocks in New
York City whose incarcerated residents cost the state more than a million dollars
annually in incarceration expenses).
214. For an estimate of the fiscal implications of reallocating the prison subsidy with a
crime-based subsidy, see Ball, supra note 41, at 1059-73.
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
and community supervision and treatment 2 5-and by assuming that regional
tastes for punishment and rehabilitation differ. Without some kind of realign-
ment, residents of one county will end up subsidizing the policies of other
counties at odds with their own. Each county should be freer to pursue its
community's interests in public safety; public safety is, after all, a local issue.16
With this freedom, however, comes the responsibility to live with the conse-
quences.
Local power to make policy is, in part, a product of expansive penal codes
that grant wide-ranging arresting, charging, and sentencing discretion to local
officials. Ironically, returning fiscal responsibility to localities might be the best
way to reverse the expansion of state penal codes. In the present system, locali-
ties have been granted a firehose and told to use it moderately; the system can-
not sustain literal, full-throated enforcement. Expanding fiscal responsibility to
localities might rein in statutory expansion, which would rein in local power at
the same time. Counties that were happy to have harsh penalties in the state pe-
nal code might question the wisdom of these same penalties if they were made
to foot the bill. If localities faced the resource implications of these laws, state
sentencing schemes might at last face downward pressure from local actors.
What, then, might a more localized system look like? Time has permitted
only a brief sketch; the aim of this Article has been mostly to diagnose the con-
dition, not prescribe policy. It would seem, though, that the state could reallo-
cate the money it currently spends on a single, no-questions-asked cure-
prison-to the disease-crime. To the extent that crime is co-extensive with
other issues, such as poverty, poor education, and the like, funds could be real-
located on these grounds as well. The state could also continue to provide pris-
on beds but not subsidize them, charging counties a capitation fee per prisoner.
Or states could get out of the prison business entirely.
The state could always be more involved, of course. The state could, and
can, always shrink its penal code, train district attorneys, and serve to monitor
the redistributive concerns expressed in Part V.C. Our current system, however,
does nothing to prevent inequality, and, in fact, it makes the accurate diagnosis
of inequality more difficult. We maintain the fiction of a "state" system and a
215. There are alternatives to local control, such as state unification of all corrections
agencies. For a general discussion, see, Barbara Krauth, A Review of the Jail Func-
tion Within State Unified Corrections Systems, NAT'L INST. OF CORR. (1997),
http://nicic.gov/Library/o14o24. In another article, I propose that unified correc-
tions be localized and expanded to include law enforcement-making agencies
geographically smaller but all-encompassing within a given area. See Ball, supra
note 6.
216. David Weisburd, for example, has argued that crime is a place-based phenome-
non. See David Weisburd, Shifting Crime and Justice Resources from Prisons to Po-
lice, lo CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 153, 155 (2011) (reviewing the literature and
concluding that "crime is 'tightly coupled' to place," suggesting "promise for re-
ducing crime without increasing imprisonment if the police can put places rather
than people at the center of the crime equation").
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"state" problem when these problems are actually the result of local policies that
merely aggregate at the state level. Under a stateless system, we might end up
agreeing that counties shouldn't have discretion in some areas-that they are
over- or under-punishing. We might rein in the number of substantive offenses.
But counties are different now. Counties over- or under-punish now. The only
difference is that we pretend that the prison population is the state's problem,
so we can ignore localities' role.
There is nothing necessary about a system where state governments pay for
prisons, and there are many reasons why we might want to change it. Unless
and until we can all agree on what statewide policies should be, we would be
better off to agree to disagree and let each locality reap what it sows.
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